 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||
|
 |
 |
|
|
||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||
 |
 |
|
||||||||||
 |
|
|||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
Report No. 99 Argument 1. Under the circumstances of the case, delay between the arrest and initial appearance of appellant was unnecessary and unreasonable within the meaning of Great State Rules of Criminal Procedure § 118, thus rendering appellant's confession and the evidence flowing from it inadmissible at trial. The mandate of Great State R. Crim. P. § 118 is clear: "when a defendant has been arrested without a warrant, he shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper judicial authority where a complaint shall be filed against him." In connection therewith, your honorable court has held: "All evidence obtained during unnecessary delay between arrest and initial appearance in inadmissible and that evidence which has no reasonable relationship to the delay whatsoever." (Here, relevant cases are cited). In the instant case, the initial appearance of the appellant before a magistrate was delayed after completion of the administrative processing associated with arrest and booking. This delay, of approximately one hour, was not caused by unavailability of a magistrate. Instead, the time was used for interrogation of appellant by the police without the presence of counsel and while appellant was in a state of apprehension after having being physically "roughed up" by police a arrest, and concluded with appellant's inculpatory statement. Delay for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements from an arrestee is clearly permissible under rule 118 as construed in Great State v. Futch, 447 CS 392 your honourable court quoted from Adams v. United States, 399 E 2d 574 (579) (DC Cir 1968) (construed opinion) as to what constitutes permissible delay between arrest and initial appearance: Necessary delay can reasonably relate to administratively process an accused with booking, fingerprinting and other steps and sometimes even to make same (sic) limited preliminary investigation into his connection with the crime for which he was arrested, especially When it is Directed to Possible Exculpation of the one Arrested (Emphasis Added) The one-hundred minute detention and delay before the initial appearance in the instant case was not consumed solely in administratively processing the accused", nor was any of is "directed to possible exculpation of the one arrested." Instead, a delay of one hour was used to secure inculpatory statements. Such delay cannot be said to be either necessary or reasonable terms of rule 118. Thus it represents a clear violation of the requirements of that rule, and any evidence obtained as a result of the delay must be excluded. 2.................................... 3.................................... Conclusion For the reasons stated above appellant submits that the verdict and judgment of the lower court must be reversed, Respectfully submitted 789, Main Street    |
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
 |
|
|||||||||||
 |
|
 |
|
|||||||||
Back