 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||
|
 |
 |
|
|
||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||
 |
 |
|
||||||||||
 |
|
|||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
Report No. 69 V. Rights 8.79. Meaning of "right".- There existed for some time a controversy as to the word 'right' in section 13. After the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Ranjan,1 it is clear that the section is not confined (as the law is confined in England) to the proof of incorporeal rights.2 The section applies to all kinds of Rights-whether rights of full ownership, or falling short of ownership, e.g. rights of easement, etc. A right may be public or general or private. Further, a right may be (i) incorporeal, e.g. a right of way; or (a) corporeal, e.g. right of ownership.3 It may be noted that the word 'right' occurs only once in the Code before section 13-in the definition of "fads in issue"-where it must necessarily have been used in the largest sense. In the absence, therefore, of any qualification-such as is to be found in section 48-the expression "rights and customs" in section 13 must be understood as comprehending all rights and customs recognised by law, and, therefore, including a right of owneship.4 On this point, a clarification is not needed. 1. Ram Ranjan Chakrabarti v. Ram Narain Singh, ILR 22 Cal 533: 22 IA 60. 2. Raghupat Tewari v. Pandit Narbadeshwar Prasad Tewari, AIR 1938 Pat 103. 3. (a) Tepu Khan v. Rajani Mohun Das, ILR 25 Cal 5221. (b) Ramkrishna v. Niranjan Pande, AIR 1933 Pat 285. (c) Rangayyan v. Innasimuthu Mudali, AIR 1956 Mad 226 (229). 4. See cases, supra.    |
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
 |
|
|||||||||||
 |
|
 |
|
|||||||||
Back